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Bankruptcy is one of the central institutions of capitalism.  Without bankruptcy, limited 
liability firms could not have arisen; and arguably, without limited liability firms, 
capitalism, at least as we know it, could not have developed.1   In spite of its importance, 
the subject has, until recently, received scant attention either from micro-economists or 
macro-economists.2  Arguably, one of the reasons for the dismal performance of IMF 
policies in the East Asian crises was their failure to take into account adequately the 
implications of those policies for bankruptcy, and the implications of bankruptcy for both 
aggregate demand and supply.3  In the context of that crisis, it was argued that more 
extensive reliance on bankruptcy and standstills would have been more effective than the 
big bail-outs; indeed, it was only with the “forced” roll-over of Korean loans (equivalent 
to a standstill) that Korea’s exchange rate stabilized.  Such measures might have reduced 
capital outflows out of the country, and this in turn would have led to a strengthening of 
the exchange rate.4 
 
The Argentine crisis has once again brought to the fore the problems of sovereign 
bankruptcy. Such issues were, of course, very much at the fore of policy discussions 
earlier, in the 1980 debt crisis 5 (even though, surprisingly, they got relatively little 
attention after Russia’s 1998 default).   
 
Attitudes towards bankruptcy have changed markedly over the past century.  In the 
nineteenth century, when individuals could not pay their debts, they were thrown into 
debtor prisons; and while it was typically difficult, from that locale, for individuals to 
earn the money with which to repay their debts, the horrific prison conditions did have 
incentive effects—it did discourage over borrowing and did encourage repayments 
among those who could—and even induced relatives to bail-out their hapless siblings, 
children, and cousins.6  At the international level, when Mexico or Egypt could not repay 
its debts, British and French armies moved in; governments were not shy from enforcing 
the claims of their citizens—or perhaps more accurately, they used such claims as an 
excuse for their colonial and imperialistic policies.   
 
Today, these practices are generally viewed with disfavor.  I know of no serious proposal 
for the U.S. military to march to Argentina, or Russia, to enforce debt claims, or for the 
reestablishment of debtor prisons.  But the issue of the appropriate way to resolve 
situations where debtors cannot pay what is owed creditors remains subject to 
controversy.  In some circles, one hears discussions such as “countries should adopt a 
good bankruptcy law,” suggesting that there is a Pareto Dominant bankruptcy law, to 
                                                 
1 Greenwald and Stiglitz [1992]. 
2 Early literature includes Stiglitz [1969, 1972], (other references). Hart…  Greenwald and Stiglitz have 
explored the implications in a series of papers, most notably Greenwald and Stiglitz [1993, 2002]  For a 
recent policy oriented review, see Stiglitz [2000] 
3 The IMF, of course, is not alone. It was simply following the practice of older textbooks.  Note, for 
instance, the treatment in Fischer and Dornbush (check) 
4  Miller and Stiglitz [1999] provide a simple equilibrium theoretical model showing that this is the case. 
5 See, for instance   xxxx   .  For a review of certain theoretical issues, see Eaton, Gersovitz, and Stiglitz 
[1986]. 
6 There were, from a historical perspective, perhaps further advantages:  the debtors helped populate 
Australia and some of the American colonies. 
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which all reasonable people would accede.  But the United States has been embroiled in a 
dispute over bankruptcy law reform for half a decade, with pitched battles between what 
appear to be creditor and debtor interests.  If there were a single bankruptcy code that 
made all market participants better off, presumably it would be adopted.  To be sure, 
advocates of, say, creditor interests try to convince others that the structures which they 
propose would make markets work better—and hence make everyone better off.   
 
On the face of it, sovereign bankruptcy is markedly different from private default.  In the 
latter, the creditor can seize assets.  Fro the most part, creditors of countries have limited 
claim on the country’s assets.  Yet many of the economic issues have their parallels.  In 
this essay, I begin by briefly describing the key economic issues in private sector default.  
In section II, I describe the key differences between private sector debt and sovereign 
debt.  In section III, I analyze the key policy proposals. 
 
I. PRIVATE SECTOR RESTRUCTURINGS 
 
Individuals and firms sometimes borrow more than they can repay.  Economic policies 
are directed at creating efficient and fair outcomes.  Standard economic theory, based on 
models of perfect information, is only partially helpful; if information were perfect 
presumably the creditor would have known that the debtor would not be repaying, in 
which case he would not have lent the money in the first place.  Understanding principles 
of imperfect and asymmetric information (and associated problems of imperfections in 
competition) are thus essential in the analysis of policy.  Simplistic approaches, based on 
market fundamentalism, get one nowhere. 
 
There are several efficiency issues, which often work against each other: 
a) Efficiency in screening and sorting:  The lender should exercise due diligence in 
sorting out good from bad borrowers. The incentive structures should be such as 
to discourage those who do not have the capability of repaying the loan from 
borrowing excessively.  Associated with the provision of credit are real resource 
allocations.  If credit goes to people who have bad ideas, resources will flow to 
projects with low returns.   
 
b) Efficiency in restructuring:  After bankruptcy, it is important for resources to be 
redeployed efficiently.  Bankruptcy does not destroy resources.  The machines 
that were built still exist.  It may have been a mistake to build them in the first 
place; but given that they were built, the issue is, what should be done with them.  
In some cases, bankruptcy provides a signal that management does not have 
competence to manage resources well; restructuring needs to be accompanied by 
new management.  In other cases, there needs to be a more fundamental real 
restructuring, that is to say, the organization needs to be liquidated, and the assets 
redeployed.  In still other cases, only the chief financial officer should be 
replaced; there needs to be a financial restructuring. 
 
The most serious problems arise from the delay in resolution, for in this period, 
there is no clear owner of the firm; and as usual, when there are no clear owners, 
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there are incentives for asset stripping, and impediments to wealth creation.  That 
is why in more advanced industrial countries, during this interim period, courts 
appoint trustees; but while such trustees can avoid the worst abuses, it is still the 
case that delay in restructuring can be very costly.   
   
c) Efficiency ex ante, before default:  The awareness of the probability of default can 
lead to distorted behavior.  An owner-manager has an incentive to try to increase 
its income in the no-bankruptcy state, at the expense of income in the bankruptcy 
state.   The creditor wants the borrower to do everything he can to minimize the 
risk of default and to ensure that, should there be a default, there is the most 
income available for creditors.  There is a clear conflict of interest between 
creditors and equity owners, and the nature of the bankruptcy law/contract 
provisions affects the outcomes.7   There are also efficiency issues related to the 
timing of default.  The issue is similar to that of when do you call the fire 
department when there is a fire.8  If there is a penalty, there is always an incentive 
to delay calling the fire department, in the hope that somehow the fire will go out 
on its own.  The stronger the penalties associated with bankruptcy (and therefore 
the stronger the incentives not to go bankrupt) the stronger the incentive to delay 
going into bankruptcy, beginning the restructuring process; but there can be large 
costs associated with this delay.   
 
d) Efficiency in enforcement:  If debtors do not repay, then credit markets will not 
work.  If there are large costs of collection, such costs act like a “tax” and dampen 
the market.  As we have noticed, debtor prisons may have, in fact, improved the 
efficiency in enforcement, lowering private costs of contract enforcement. 
 
e) Efficiency in risk sharing:  Debt contracts typically do a far worse job in risk 
sharing than equity contracts.9  But in the event of bankruptcy, debt contracts can 
and do help share risk.  The design of the bankruptcy provisions affects how well 
they perform this risk sharing. 
 
f) Transactional efficiency: Bankruptcy and its resolution are costly, to the parties 
involved, and, when there are systemic disruptions, to society more broadly.  
Under some bankruptcy codes, the costs of resolution are higher than under 
others; under some bankruptcy codes, bankruptcies may occur more frequently, so 
that more resources may be dissipated in bankruptcy resolution.   
 
Equity issues are more complicated, and often not well understood.  At one level, 
creditors always get compensated for the risks that they bear.  If the system is 
distortionary or inefficient, it may result in interest rates received by creditors being 
higher than they otherwise would be.  So long as there are clear rules, lenders should 
be essentially indifferent to bankruptcy regimes, since they will get the certainty 
                                                 
7 See Stiglitz [1985] 
8 See Orszag and Stiglitz [2002] 
9 There are a variety of reasons why, nonetheless, they are employed, having to do with imperfect 
information (costly state verification, adverse selection, and moral hazard) 
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equivalent return to what they would have received had they say put their money in a 
safe asset.   
 
There are two important qualifications to this argument.  First, lenders may exploit 
borrowers—that is credit markets are typically far from competitive—and the 
bankruptcy laws may affect the extent of exploitation. 
 
Second, even in competitive markets there can be distributional consequences; that is, 
the competitive equilibrium that emerges in markets in which bankruptcy risk is 
pervasive can be affected by the bankruptcy regime.  Assume, for instance, that there 
is a scarcity of lenders willing to bear large risks, and that for some reason or other 
mutual funds diversifying bankruptcy risk do not exist.  Then a regime that imposes 
more of the risk on the lender may lead to more than offsetting high interest rates.  
There is a general equilibrium effect, with the distribution of income changing in 
favor of the lender.  On the other hand, if lenders are risk neutral, so that they charge 
no risk premium for bearing greater risk, then a regime which imposes more of the 
risk on the lender shifts the distribution of welfare towards borrowers. 
 
The debate in the United States focused extensively on concerns about exploitation. 
This was highlighted by teenage children receiving letters in the mail congratulating 
them on being certified as credit worthy, and granting them a credit card with a $5000 
credit limit.  If they should make use of the card—and cannot repay—who should 
bear the costs?  It seems unfair either to make the child or his parents bear these costs.    
 
At different points in time, various of the concerns we have listed may turn out to be 
paramount.  Once bankruptcy has occurred, the focus turns to efficient and quick 
resolution; but the policies that relate to resolution affect behavior prior to the 




If there were a single set of rules and procedures with which sometimes conflicting 
objectives could simultaneously be pursued, bankruptcy law would hardly be a matter 
of controversy.  But it is.   
 
At a theoretical level, there appear to be three major sets of issues: 
a) Contracts vs. legal arrangements.  Why is there a bankruptcy law at all?  Why 
don’t contracts themselves simply specify what will happen in the event of a “breach” 
of the credit contract   Accordingly, why do we need anything other than standard 
contract law?   
 
b) Creditor vs. debtor friendly rules.  Some rules are believed to be friendlier to the 
creditor side, others to the debtor.  Since, of course, were this the case, as we have 
already noted, more debtor friendly rules would presumably result in higher lending 
rates (in a rational expectations equilibrium) Thus, what is at issue are differential 
impacts on different groups of creditors and debtors.  A more debtor friendly regime 
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forces more screening and sorting; thus, higher risk borrowers are less likely to be 
subsidized by lower risk borrowers, and such borrowers may well be excluded from 
the market.   
 
c) Procedural issues.  Much of bankruptcy law concerns the procedures by which 
bankruptcy is resolved.   
 
Problems of transactions costs and market imperfections, especially related to 
imperfect information, are central to understanding controversies over bankruptcy.  In 
a world with perfect capital markets and perfect information, the assets of a bankrupt 
firm would be sold to the highest bidder; the bidding would entail bidding 
simultaneously over separate pieces and the entire organization.  The party (parties) 
willing to pay the most would be those who would make the best use of the resource, 
and the proceeds would then be distributed among the claimants according to 
seniority.  But in such a world, the firm is always up for restructuring, as existing 
management is always looking for the best way to deploy the resources, as are 
alternative management teams.   
 
The literature on corporate governance has explained why the market for managers 
may be far from perfect.  Similar problems, and a few additional ones, arise in forced 
restructuring.   Assume there were two classes of creditors.  If the senior creditor 
were to have the responsibility of restructuring, he would seek to maximize the value 
of his asset, e.g. by maximizing the probability that the firm earn at least what he is 
owed; but it would pay little attention to ensuring that it earned more than that, so that 
there may be little left over for the junior creditor.  As a result, it is often proposed 
that the junior creditor be left initially in control, so long as he can fully pay the 
claims of the senior creditor.  But the same argument implies that he has no incentive 
to ensure that there is something left over for the equity owners.  That is why it is 
often proposed that the equity owners be left initially in control, so long as they can 
effectively satisfy the claims of the debtors.  But they will typically attempt to do so 
by providing debtors with equity, warrants or other instruments, which may 
themselves not be marketable, and accordingly, for which there may be 
disagreements about the true value.  (More generally, equity owners believe that the 
market has undervalued the firm.  The distinction between solvency and liquidity is to 
a large extent based on a disagreement over the value of the firm; if everyone agreed, 
then a firm which was solvent would be able to obtain finance, and accordingly it 
would be liquid.) 
 
As another example, control rights to a firm matter, particularly when there are 
difficult and contentious decisions to be made that affect different claimants 
differently.  There is no simple way of valuing these control rights; yet different 
workouts distribute control rights differently.  What’s more, it is often difficult to 
define precisely these control rights, e.g. in practice, in some legal systems, a 
minority shareholder may have no rights, though under other legal systems, he may 
have substantial rights. 
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If restructuring were simply a zero sum game, so long as the rules were clear, it 
would make little difference for overall economic efficiency; but it is not a zero sum 
game, and the rules can, accordingly have large effects on overall economic 
performance. 
 
Contracts versus legal structures 
 
Bankruptcy essentially entails a financial (and in some cases real) restructuring of the 
firm, with different assignments of control and income rights.  At first blush, as we 
have noted, one might have thought that this could be done by contract, specifying 
what happens in the event that the debtor cannot repay a loan.  One might still want, 
within the contract, to have many issues resolved by an arbiter, e.g. the valuation of 
non-marketed assets.  Difficulties arise, however, with respect to implicit contracts, 
for instance the rights of workers or of suppliers.  In some cases, it may not be clear 
which creditor is senior.  
 
Even when there are explicit contracts, the costs of fully specifying what should 
happen in every contingency is such that all contracts are “incomplete.”  A complete 
set of contracts would have to specify the amounts of equity and debt (and every 
other action of the management of the firm) in every state of nature; but that would 
eliminate the need for management.  Managerial discretion (delegation) arises 
because shareholders and bondholders cannot have all the requisite information.  
Managerial contracts are traditionally thought of as attempting to align the interests of 
the agent (the manager) with that of the principal (the shareholder), but in fact, in 
modern corporations, there are multiple principals (e.g. other suppliers of credit).  
(For an elaboration of this perspective, see Stiglitz, 1985).   
 
Virtually every action of management can be thought of as impinging on the value of 
bondholders’ assets.  For instance, the issuance of additional bonds, even junior 
bonds, affects managerial incentives (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) in ways which can be 
adverse to the interests of earlier bondholders; on the other hand, in certain 
contingencies, not borrowing can adversely affect their interests, as projects which 
might be highly profitable will have to be terminated (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1983).  The 
advantage of bank lending is that banks are engaged in constant monitoring; the short 
leash of short-term borrowing means that if the firm does something that significantly 
adversely affects creditors’ interests, they can withdraw their credit and demand 
immediate repayment.  (Rey and Stiglitz).  Bonds typically impose covenants that 
address a few of the most serious concerns, but clearly such covenants are no 
substitute for the close monitoring of banks. 
 
The fact that contracts are incomplete means that when a firm does go bankrupt, there 
is often ambiguity concerning the treatment, including priority, of various claims.  
For instance, when exchange rates are changing rapidly, at what exchange rate are 
dollar and domestic claims to be valued?  Unless the contract specifies, e.g. that they 
should be valued on a particular, well-specified date, such as the date of default, there 
can be major disagreements.  When the rupiah fell from 2000 to the dollar to 18,000 
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to the dollar, it meant that the rupiah value of dollar denominated debt increased nine 
fold.  But one could argue that the “market” exchange rates were not equilibrium 
exchange rates, that the markets were thin, possibly even manipulated, that they did 
not, accordingly, represent a “fair” or “true” price.  Clearly, it makes enormous 
difference to all creditors on how such disputes are resolved.  If some dollar-
denominated debts are senior, a high valuation may essentially wipe out the chance of 
junior claimants recovering anything.  Rupiah creditors may delay arriving at an 
agreement, in the hopes that the rupiah will recover value.   When dollar creditors are 
given assets, rather than dollars, to “satisfy” their claims, how are those assets to be 
valued?    How are we to value, in dollars, the expected present discounted value of 
future profits, when those profits are earned in rupiah? 
 
There is, in some circles, a naïve belief that markets, if left to themselves, will arrive 
at efficient solutions through a process of bargaining.  There is little evidence or 
theory to support such a conclusion.   Indeed, the theory of bargaining with imperfect 
information shows that there is often recourse to inefficient signals as a way of 
conveying information that results in a resolution that is more to one’s favor.  Strikes 
are obviously inefficient, in the sense that productive resources are left unused.  Yet 
labor management bargaining often ends in strikes, as one side or the other wishes to 
convey to others their “toughness” through their willingness to bear losses.  (See, e.g. 
Farrell [    ]).  Delay in arriving at a resolution to a bankruptcy dispute can be viewed 
in a similar way.  The delay results in a wastage of resources—typically the value of 
the firm deteriorates; it’s access to capital will be hampered; and 
management/controlling shareholders may have an incentive to strip assets, which 
court appointed trustees may only partially ameliorate.  Yet delay may be more costly 
to one party than to others, and delay in reaching an agreement may be the only 
effective way of conveying this information (which affects the nature of the 
bargaining solution.)   
 
In the case of macro-economic disturbances that lead to systemic bankruptcies (as in 
East Asia), there are social costs to delaying resolution than go well beyond the 
private costs.  Failure to resolve large numbers of such disputes has effects on both 
aggregate demand and supply, leading to higher levels of aggregate unemployment 
and the underutilization of human and other resources.  The participants in the 
bargaining do not take these macro-economic consequences (which are effectively 
externalities) into account in their decisions concerning the speed of resolution. 
 
Much attention has recently been given to the design of contract provisions allowing 
for “collective action,” that is, for a majority or supermajority of bondholders to 
impose their views of the appropriate resolution on minorities.  The discussion has 
been motivated by scavenger funds, or holdouts, who, under a unanimity rule, can 
effectively veto any proposed resolution.  They attempt to use the veto power to 
extract for themselves a favorable deal, e.g. full repayment of what is owed (even 
though they purchased the debt at a discount.)  Since the cost of delay to others 
(including the debtor) can be quite high, they have, in some instances, succeeded.    
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The above discussion should make clear that even with such clauses, there remain 
complicated bargaining problems among classes of creditors, and given the different 
nature of claims (including priorities), there is no similar way of resolving such 
disputes through majority, or supermajority, voting.  (For instance, junior creditors 
would, in that case, simply vote for bankruptcy resolutions that strip away much of 
the claim of senior creditors.  If the junior creditors were domestic, they might vote 
that dollar claims of more senior creditors be valued at an exchange rate that leaves 
more left over for themselves.  In the case of the bankruptcy of several Korean 
conglomerates, domestic creditors, lending to subsidiaries, had collateralized much of 
their debt, while foreign creditors, lending to the holding company, lent without 
collateral.  The value of their claims clearly depended on how domestic creditors 
were treated, and it is not clear that either fairness or efficiency would be well served 
by simply letting the majority of claimants, whether that be the domestic or foreign 
creditors, determine the outcome. )   
 
Even within a class, there may be genuine differences of interests, and particular 
interests can purchase bonds to advance their interests.  This can be true even with 
collective action clauses.  Assume, for instance, that a simple majority was required.  
Assume, moreover, that there were two classes of creditors, and that there was a 
single owner of a junior class, while ownership of the more senior class was widely 
dispersed.  The junior class creditor might find it profitable to buy a majority of the 
debt of the senior class, and then vote in support of treatments that would decrease the 
value of those claims (e.g. if the debt was dollar denominated, then it might vote to 
“accept” a high exchange rate.)  The junior creditor would gain more in his “junior” 
claims than he loses on his senior claims.  Effectively, he is depriving the “minority” 
senior bondholders of their property rights.  Worse still, the senior creditors, 
recognizing this, will be willing to sell their bonds to the junior creditor at a low 
value.10   In effect, the junior creditors can manage a “takeover” of the senior 
creditors.  Clearly, requiring a supermajority makes this more difficult.  But the larger 
the supermajority, the easier it is for a scavenger to try to extract favorable treatment.  
Indeed, with a large supermajority, the junior creditors could purchase a small share 
and bloc any agreement that was not consistent with their broader interests. 
 
Of course, even the debtor can make use of these mechanisms.  It can, in effect, buy 
back half the bonds, and from that position, deprive the remaining bondholders of 
their interests. To be sure, covenants are designed to ensure that this not be done, so 
the debtor may not be able to do so himself; but “allies” of the debtor may do so.   
 
The fact that there is a widespread belief that market participants should be 
encouraged (through a variety of incentives) to have such collective action clauses is 
evidence that even those who believe in market based solutions do not have 
confidence that the market will arrive at efficient contract provisions.  But if the 
market cannot, ex ante, arrive at efficient contract provisions, why should one expect 
it, ex post, to arrive at efficient resolutions of disputes?   
                                                 




Later, we shall explain why the problems of contract design for sovereign debt are 
likely even more severe than for private debt.  For now, we note only one reason that 
contracts are not likely to be “efficient.”  In credit markets, debtors try to convey 
information to potential lenders about their credit worthiness.  Signaling is costly (see 
Spence 1973), and in general, signaling equilibrium are inefficient (see Greenwald 
and Stiglitz, 1986).  One of the ways in which borrowers may attempt to signal that 
they are more credit worthy (less likely to default) is to agree to severe penalties in 
the event of default.  By standardizing bankruptcy provisions through a uniform 
bankruptcy code, one avoids this costly signaling process (in effect, one legislates a 
pooling equilibrium rather than the separating equilibrium which would emerge in 
the market)11 
 
The same kind of argument helps explain why standard contracts may persist, even 
when such contracts are badly designed.  Proposing an alternative to a standard 
contract may serve as a signal, which may be taken adversely; and in any case, if 
market participants believe that, by and large, contract terms represent a “zero sum” 
game, with gains to one party coming largely at the expense of others, then others 
may interpret a proposal for a new contract as reflecting inside information; given the 
inside information, the new contract will redistribute income to the proposer from the 
other party—which has the immediate implication that the other parties should resist 
the change.  (Stiglitz, 1992).  In this perspective, then, it may take public intervention 
to help move the economy from an inefficient contractual equilibrium; on the other 
hand, if the government is seen as having been captured by special interest groups 
(e.g. by creditor interests), then others will infer that the reason for the movement is 
to enhance their welfare at the expense of, say, debtor interests.  Only if the 
government can make a persuasive argument that such a reform represents a Pareto 
improvement will the reform be easily accepted. 
 
Standardization of contracts through the law not only solves the signaling problem, 
but also solves a complex coordination problem.  With a pure contract approach, each 
creditor, as he writes his credit contract, would have to look at all other contracts to 
make sure that there is no contract provision in some other contract in contradiction to 
a provision is his contract with respect to what should be done in the event of a 
default.  Transactions costs could be enormous.   
 
An approach that entails a more active role for government (judiciary) can, 
furthermore, resolve some of the inefficiencies and inequities noted above.  It could, 
for instance, enforce a more rapid resolution than would take place in a pure market 
based approach.  In East Asia, for instance, Korea and Malaysia, where government 
took an active role, were far more effective in resolving their problems than was 
Thailand, which took a more market-based approach.  Indeed, in the first three years 
after the crisis, only a handful of cases were resolved in Thailand.12   
 
                                                 
11 See Clay, Greenwald, and Stiglitz. 
12 There is, admittedly, some controversy about the reason for the slow pace. 
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Macro-economic consequences of bankruptcy 
 
The economic and legal analysis of bankruptcy has largely focused on micro-
economics, but in the situations which are of concern in crises, where there is 
systemic bankruptcy, involving large fractions of the productive capacity of the 
economy, one cannot ignore the macro-economic consequences, both on aggregate 
demand and aggregate supply.  Elsewhere I have argued that in such situations, there 
is a need for a Super Chapter 11 for an expedited resolution.13  (When there is a 
macro-economic disturbance, the inferences that can be made concerning whether the 
problems facing a firm reflect on bad management practices are markedly different 
than when there is an isolated bankruptcy; moreover, while it is relatively easy to 
replace a single manager, the challenge of replacing management in 50% of the firms 
of a country obviously is an order of magnitude greater.  Even the problem of 
trusteeship—ensuring that the assets are not stripped during the resolution process—
is much more difficult when a significant fraction of the firms in an economy are 
facing distress.) 
                                                 
13 See also Miller and Stiglitz [1999] 
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II. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SOVEREIGN BANKRUPTCY AND PRIVATE 
BANKRUPTCY 
 
This conference focuses on sovereign bankruptcy.  I have written at length 
concerning private bankruptcy because the issues there are better developed, though 
controversies remain – and both the theories and controversies provide insights into 
issues of sovereign bankruptcy.   
 
We first need to identify critical differences between sovereign and private 
bankruptcy.  The most important difference concerns contract enforcement:  the 
powers of the state are used to enforce contracts (including debt contracts and the 
provisions of bankruptcy law).   Who is to enforce the commitments of a sovereign?   
As we noted earlier, in the nineteenth century, governments of creditor countries 
enforced contracts, through the threat of—and actual use—of the military.  That is no 
longer possible.   
 
While there is some recourse to recovery through litigation, the extent of such 
recovery is limited, largely to assets that are held abroad.  Worry about such litigation 
is, however, a deterrent to default. 
 
For the most part, sovereign debt contracts are meant to be self-enforcing:  the 
consequences of not repaying—in particular, the cut off of access to future credit—
should be sufficiently severe that countries find it worthwhile to repay.   
 
Whether a country does repay depends on whether credit will in fact be cut off in the 
event of a default (and if so, for how long) and the consequences of such a cut-off. 
 
 
Threat of loss of access to capital in the long term  
 
Both theory and evidence suggest that the threat of a cutoff of credit has probably 
been exaggerated.  Markets are forward looking.  Capital asks not what was the return 
in the past, but what will the return be in the future.  The lower indebtedness from 
reneging on debt mean that the government’s fiscal deficit is lower; its financial 
position is improved.   
 
In addition, there are second and third round effects that further improve the fiscal 
position of the country, making foreign creditors more likely to lend.  As the 
government tries to service its debt, interest rates tend to rise; even if the government 
has a primary surplus, it must borrow to finance the serving of the debt.   The number 
of the firms that are forced into bankruptcy is lowered, both because of the lower 
interest rates and because of the improved overall economic performance of the 
economy that can follow a discharge of debt and using the funds previously used to 
serve the debt to finance expansionary fiscal policy.  As the economy strengthens, 
government tax revenues are increased—again improving the fiscal position of the 
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government.  Moreover, to the extent that the government gets involved in 
restructuring, the amount of restructuring required will be less, and again the fiscal 
burden will be lowered.  And because there are fewer defaults, the supply side of the 
economy is stronger (with less adverse effect both on the corporate and financial 
sector.)   All of this means that the government’s financial position is stronger going 
forward, making it more (not less) likely that creditors will be willing to provide 
finance.   
 
There is a counter-argument, that the country will obtain a reputation for defaulting, 
but there is some question about the appropriateness of such reputation models to the 
situation on hand.  Reputation models make most sense when past behavior conveys 
information about an otherwise hard to observe characteristic of an individual, from 
which one can infer likely future behavior.14  The factors influencing repayment, in 
this case, are easy to observe; and little if any additional information is conveyed, 
particularly since the decision to default is a political decision, and the political 
context can change dramatically in the space of a few years.   
 
Empirically, there is little evidence15 in support of the position that a default leads to 
an extended period of exclusion from the market.16  Russia returned to the market 
within two years of its default, which was admittedly a “messy one” involving no 
prior consultation with creditors, and on that accord roundly condemned.  Korea, 
which forced a rollover, somewhat more gracefully than Russia (creditors were given 
a choice of either rolling over the loans or not getting repaid, and recognizing them as 
in default.  While in terms of cash flow, the two alternatives look little different, 
many firms would prefer not to have to recognize the loss, so that the alternative of 
roll-overs looks more attractive.) 
 
The argument that markets will punish any defaulters ignores the central distinction 
between competitive markets and monopolies.  There may be a public interest among 
creditors in providing conditions that will ensure that debtors repay, but such an 
environment is a public good, and it is not in the interests of any small creditor to bear 
the cost of providing that environment.   
 
Under certain circumstances, it is conceivable that creditors might be able to act 
collusively; that is, creditors engage in a large number of cooperative activities, 
involving, for instance, sharing information; it is conceivable that the creditors could 
exclude from the “club” any creditor who did not go along with sanctions imposed on 
a defaulter.  However, it is not clear that such coercive actions by the creditors 
collectively would withstand anti-trust scrutiny, nor is it clear that the value of the 
cooperation is sufficiently great to induce many firms who might otherwise find it 
                                                 
14 There are two broad categories of models which go under the rubric of reputation.  The first, to which I 
am referring here, are concerned with signaling or sorting in models of asymmetric information.  In the 
second, the concern is with incentives in models of repeated interaction.  See, e.g. Shapiro [ 1983], Shapiro-
Stiglitz [1984], or Stiglitz [198   ].   
15 The example usually sited is “the lost decade” e.g. Brazil in the 1980s when banks stopped lending.   
16 see if one can find empirical studies, references 
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profitable to lend from doing so.  Thus, in practice, it is apparent that the threat of 
credit being cutting off appears not to be effective. 
 
Of course, it makes sense for an institution which is charged with trying to make 
credit markets work more effectively (and particularly from the perspective of the 
creditors themselves) to try to convince borrowers that should they default, or engage 
in a standstill, they would have to face a high price for this bad behavior, including 
the cut off of credit.  The fact that many countries act as if they seem to believe this 
message suggests that the threat is taken seriously (and it may make sense for a risk 




The Cost of lack of access to credit 
 
Assume, for the moment, that a default would lead to an extended period of lack of 
access to credit.  What are the costs, and how do those costs compare with the 
benefits?   
 
The standard argument has been that access to credit is important both to facilitate 
more rapid growth (a secular need for capital) and to stabilize the economy (a 
cyclical need for capital.)  In economies facing a crisis, the two reinforce each other:  
it is at such time that the country particularly needs capital.   
 
A closer look at the experience of most developing countries, though, cast doubt on 
these traditional arguments, at least as they relate to short term capital flows.  Over 
the long run, capital flows have been pro-cyclical, not counter cyclical; banks and 
others lend to those who do not need money, and withdraw money in times of crisis.  
That is presumably one of the reasons that capital market liberalization is associated 
with a higher macro-economic instability but not necessarily higher growth.   
 
Most countries facing a crisis thus are unlikely to see capital inflows, should they 
behave well and repay existing debt; it is only that the magnitude of capital outflows 
might be reduced from what they would be if the government both reneged on its debt 
and did not put into place some controls or taxes on outflows.   
 
These arguments are reinforced by the general theory of credit rationing, especially as 
developed in the context of sovereign debt (Eaton and Gersovitz [    ], Eaton, 
Gersovitz and Stiglitz  [198  ].  That theory is based on the theory of self-enforcing 
contracts, in which debtors assess the benefits and costs of defaulting: the larger the 
magnitude of existing debt, the greater the benefit from defaulting.  There is a critical 
level D* (which may be a function of the state of nature) such that if D rises above 
that critical level, it pays to default.  That means that if a country’s debt exceeds D*, 
it will not have access to further credit in any case.  (This argument applies to long-
term debt as well as short.) 
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The value of access to credit in the long run, to finance long-term growth, depends on 
the situation of the country.  For the countries of East Asia, where savings rates are 
sufficiently high that they have difficulty investing available domestic resources well, 
there is little benefit to increased access to foreign credit.  For poorer African 
countries, capital is often in short supply.  But even that, portfolio capital (especially 
access to short term lending) may be of limited benefit.  Foreign direct investment 
brings with it access to markets, technology, entrepreneurship, as well as capital.  The 
allegation that countries will not be able to obtain foreign direct investment if they 
impose capital controls or renege on their debts is far from persuasive; China has 
been the most successful country in the world in recruiting FDI, and yet still h as not 
liberalized its capital markets; and Malaysia continued to obtain foreign investment 
after it imposed capital controls.17  Russia’s investment after its crisis (including 
reneging on its debt) has been more robust than before—partly for the reasons 
suggested earlier, that it led to overall better macro-performance, making the country 
a more attractive place to invest.  
 
 Moreover, if the theories of credit constraints described earlier is correct, it means 
that a country with a high debt overhang is not going to be able to get more access to 
credit in any case.  Only with a reduction of the debt can inflows be resumed. 
 
 
The origins of excess debt problems 
 
Given the seeming limits on debt, a natural question arises, how is it that countries 
end up with excessive debts.  Why doesn’t the market stop lending before the 
problem arises?   
 
The answer is simple:  The critical level of debt depends on the “state of nature,” a 
variety of variables that determine the prospects of the country.  We write this as 
D*(θ), where θ is the state of nature.  Moreover, the value of the debt (in terms of 
domestic currency) is itself a random variable, when part of the debt is denominated 
in foreign exchange (like dollars), since the exchange rate is random.  Lending today 
is based on judgments concerning future prospects of the firm.  The country may be 
viewed, today, as far below its debt limit.  But suddenly, its exchange rate may 
deteriorate, interest rates may rise, and its GDP may fall, leading to an increase in the 
(domestic) value of its debt and a lowering of the country’s debt capacity.  The 
country then finds itself with excess debt.  (Of course, lenders knew that there was 
some probability that this might occur. But this was more than offset by the high 
returns in other contingencies.)   
 
                                                 
17 FDI throughout the world declined after the global financial crisis, and Malaysia’s experience reflected 
this global trend.  Neighboring Thailand, for a period, was able to recruit foreign investors to buy up its 
existing assets in the fire sales; and these fire sales probably diverted some investment from Malaysia.  But 
there was little Greenfield investment.   
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Collateral and economic reorganization 
 
In the case of private bankruptcy, when debtors cannot repay, creditors can be viewed 
as seizing the assets, reorganizing them in ways which maximize value, paying 
themselves off what is owed, and returning the remaining money to the equity 
owners.  But clearly, creditors cannot seize a country; and it isn’t clear what assets 
really belong to the government in the first place.  Moreover, it is difficult to assess 
the value of other claimants (and their priority).  If standard practice from private 
bankruptcy were followed, then wage claims would be treated as a priority class.  But 
what about pension claims, which can be viewed as a form of deferred wages? 
 
 More recently, countries have proposed collateralizing particular assets, like oil 
revenues, so that in the event of default, a creditor could seize the asset.  But so long 
as the asset remains within the jurisdiction of the country, the country can take 
measures that renationalize the asset (though such measures may be increasingly 
circumscribed by the terms of a variety of trade and other agreements.)  Still, such 
collateralized assets will remain a small fraction of sovereign debt, and in the rest of 





Most of the concerns in the design of bankruptcy regimes apply in the context of 
sovereign debt, though each of the issues takes on special forms.  For instance, the 
issue of ex post efficiency is not so much one of restructuring finance and control to 
ensure the efficient utilization of assets as it is that debt burden and constraints 
imposed as part of debt restructuring be such as to promote full employment and 
growth of the economy.   
 
Countries with heavy debt burdens may find it difficult financing counter cyclical 
fiscal policies, and in situations where monetary policies and exchange rate 
adjustment have limited effectiveness or long lags, fiscal stimulation may be 
particularly important.  Some countries have primary surpluses, but large deficits, 
reflecting the heavy burden of debt payments; and when much of the debt payments 
go abroad, the deficits, even when large, have no stimulatory effect (except through 
the indirect effects of the foreign transfers on the exchange rate.)   
 
There are also difficult issues concerning the timing of default.  When there are large 
costs of default (e.g. a stigma18) there will be a tendency to delay; there is an option 
                                                 
18 The earlier discussion suggested that the costs may be far less than is widely believed.  Nonetheless, for 
those in office, default is typically viewed as a failure, and they may bear significant costs, e.g. removal 
from office.  There may be large disparities between the costs to society and the costs borne by political 
actors, consistent with the theory of escalating commitments. 
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value associated with delay—there is some chance that the economy will recover—
and so delay may occur even though on average such delay is costly.19 
 
In private markets, one of the key issues concerning ex ante efficiency is that, as the 
likelihood of default increases, so do incentives for asset stripping, and more broadly 
increasing expected income of the “owner”/controller at the expense of creditors.  
While legal strictures may limit patently fraudulent transfers, there are a variety of 
more subtle ways by which such redistributions/transfers of income/wealth can occur.  
In the case of sovereign debt, the concern is more with costly actions taken to avoid 
default, e.g. excessively stringent fiscal and monetary policies, sometimes with large 
long run costs, or selling off state assets at fire sale prices.   
 
Ironically, critics of many countries facing the threat of bankruptcy suggest that there 
are precisely the opposite biases; countries are reluctant to undertake the “painful” 
measures that are required.  The increased debt that results from not cutting back 
expenditures enough effectively weakens the claims of pre-existing creditors, and 
weakens the incentives to avoid a default.   
 
Whether there will be a bias towards excessive leniency or excess stringency depends 
to a large extent on the costs of default; with large costs of default, especially to those 
in power, there will be a tendency for excessive stringency.   
 
It should be noted, however, that perspectives on whether there is a bias towards 
excessive leniency or excessive stringency depends on whose interests are being 
focused upon.  There may be large conflicts of interest.  Policies that enhance the 
ability of the country to repay its debt need not maximize the welfare of the debtor 
country.  For instance, a policy which stresses the quick build up of dollar reserves 
may facilitate the country’s repaying back dollar debts, but that policy may lead to 
high levels of unemployment, as imports are restricted and as the supply price of 
exports is lowered through a cutback in the demand for non-tradables.  (To be sure, 
arguments are put forward that a failure to repay loans will have serious adverse 
effects on the economy’s growth both in the short run and the long, and that this 
effect is dominant; but there is little empirical support for this particular lexigraphic 
ordering of policies. On the contrary, one can argue that strengthening the domestic 
economy will, over the medium term, most enhance the ability of the country to repay 
its loans, and accordingly, policies which focus on strengthening the economies short 
run output should predominate.20) 
 
Related, perspectives on whether there is a bias towards excessive leniency or 
stringency depends on views of the appropriate economic model.  If one believes that 
                                                 
19 Orszag and Stiglitz [2001] have analyzed this in the context of “when to call the fire department.”  The 
greater the penalties imposed when the fire department is called, the longer the delay.  Thus, tough IMF 
conditionality is itself part of the cause of delay.  More broadly, policies taken after bankruptcy have an 
effect on when bankruptcy will be declared. 
20 Such views are consistent with the unit root literature, which suggests that policies that lead to an 
increase in output today will have permanent effects.  See 
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the worse thing for performance of an economy in both the short run and the long is a 
deficit, then failure to address the deficit will inevitably be viewed as a hidden form 
of asset stripping:  the country today is able to enjoy a higher living standard (than it 
could if it limited itself to living within its means), at the expense of creditors, who, 
when default occurs, will have to share the assets among themselves.  On the 
contrary, if one believes that deficit spending in a situation of deficient aggregate 
demand leads to increases in GDP that are a multiple of the deficit, and if a 
substantial part of that deficit is spent on investment goods, then deficit actually 
enhances the ability of the economy to repay what is owed creditors.   
 
We noted in our discussion of private bankruptcy the importance of disagreements 
about the consequences of alternative actions.  Bankruptcy would be a relatively 
simple matter in the presence of perfect (or symmetric) information.  It is 
disagreements about the values of assets and the consequences of actions that make 
the resolution of bankruptcy both important and difficult.  The same thing is true for 
sovereign bankruptcy.  A central issue then is whose judgment will be given 
deference.   
 
In the case of chapter 11 bankruptcies, when debtors propose a reorganization plan, 
the judgment of debtors is given considerable weight.  Creditors can object that they 
are being unfairly treated, and the court must evaluate these claims. I shall argue that 
similar issues arise in the context of sovereign bankruptcy. 
 
 
Contract design and broader incentive issues 
 
Earlier, we noted that in private markets, there were not incentives for the design of 
efficient contract provisions.  The problem in sovereign debt markets is even greater, 
because of what may be termed political economy problems.  The current government 
benefits from lower interest rates that may be obtained by provisions that are 
excessively favorable to creditors; the costs of such provisions will be borne by later 
administrations.  This exacerbates the signaling problem noted in private markets; 
there at least the same party bears the cost that receives the benefit from the costly 
signal.  (Note that signals need not be socially efficient; particularly when the benefits 
of socially inefficient signals are received by parties that are different from those that 
bear the costs.) 
 
Agency problems also arise on the part of creditors.  Those who promoted excessive 
lending to Latin America in the 70s did not bear the full costs of their mistakes; 
shareholders of the lending institutions did, but those who were responsible for the 
lending often went unpunished; indeed, their aggressiveness was sometimes 
rewarded.  Since everyone else was lending to Latin America as well, how could they 
be blamed?  Intermediaries who make money by bond issuance have every incentive 
to insert bond provisions that keep interest rates low; the more that is borrowed, the 
more their profits.   
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The greater difficulty in debt workouts today, compared to the era of bank finance, is 
not just due to the greater dispersion of ownership, but to the difference in incentives 
for a resolution.  Banks have an incentive for rollovers, to avoid recognizing losses, 
because the regulatory costs of such recognition (in terms of reserves) can be high.  
On the other hand, some bondholders gain from the recognition of losses (through tax 
write-offs), and the asymmetric treatment of capital gains and losses may, under some 




Competition in legal structures 
 
Given that there are different views about what an appropriate legal structure should 
be, one suggestion is that there be competition among legal structures, with an 
agreement on mutual recognition; that is, if debt contracts of a country are written 
under the laws of a particular jurisdiction, then claimants may only seek redress under 
that jurisdiction.  (This does not fully resolve what happens when there are multiple 
contracts, written under different jurisdictions.) 
 
The notion is that just as competitive processes lead to efficient contracts, given a 
legal structure, competition among legal structures will lead to efficient legal 
structures.  But the problems noted earlier (e.g. concerning signaling) imply that such 
competition will not in general result in efficiency; debtors may choose an 
excessively “tough” (on debtors) jurisdiction to signal that they are unlikely to go 
bankrupt, even if the legal structure is economically inefficient.     
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III A MORE EQUITABLE AND EFFICIENT SDRM 
 
There is now broad recognition of a need for a better sovereign debt resolution 
mechanism (SDRM), one which not only provides for a speedier resolution with less 
uncertainty, but one which is more attentive to the interests of the debtor countries.  
Chapters 9 and 11 of America’s bankruptcy code provide some of the ingredients.   
 
 The sovereign will initiate the debt resolution, and it will be encouraged to do 
so at an early stage, by ensuring that the resolution process pays due attention 
to its concerns.21 
 At the initiation of the debt resolution, there will be a stay on litigation 
 New lending, especially for short-term trade purposes, will be treated as 
senior to existing debt. 
 The country will need to consider the imposition of temporary exchange 
controls and/or exit taxes to stabilize capital flows. 
 The sovereign will, within a short period of time, after discussions with 
different creditors, propose a restructuring (which may include rescheduling, 
and debt write downs).  It should detail those aspects of an economic plan that 
might affect the value of any contingent assets, and the basis of its claim that 
raising taxes or cutting expenditures would either not enhance its ability to 
repay or would impose undue costs. 
 Those who believe that the proposed restructuring treats them adversely may 
submit counterproposals. Such objections and counterproposals should 
provide a methodology for assessing the magnitude of the effective debt 
write-down and an evaluation of the seniority of different creditor claims.  A 
question that should be addressed is whether the past amount received is at all 
relevant in determining fair division.   
 Claims that the country could reasonably meet its debt obligations by raising 
taxes or by cutting expenditures without undue adverse effects would be 
substantiated by economic models and political analysis. 
 The bankruptcy court would rule on the alternative resolution proposals, 
giving deference to the proposal of the sovereign and its legitimate concerns 
to maintain the economic strength of the economy in the short run and the 
long, and recognizing the claims not only of foreign and domestic 
bondholders but also of other claimants, including pensioners and workers.   
 
In a sense, such a proposal recognizes that if market mechanisms work even 
reasonably well, then a sovereign would not have an incentive to declare 
bankruptcy when it need not, because of the “punishment” of capital markets.  
There is no reason to augment that punishment by further measures. Indeed, the 
political consequences of a bankruptcy should be sufficiently great so that there is 
little need for concern about a “moral hazard” problem.  If anything, as we have 
noted, countries tend to postpone bankruptcy.     
                                                 
21 As we noted, large penalties, including the implosion of excessively contractionary monetary and fiscal 
policies, serve as a deterrent to entering into the resolution process. 
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Moreover, since markets would have fully compensated creditors for the risks 
they bore in the form of higher ex ante interest rates, there is, as we have noted, 
little need to be concerned with equitable treatment of creditors, so long as there 
are clear rules.   
 
There may be a concern that such a debtor friendly regime may lead to higher 
interest rates and thus impede the flow of capital to developing countries—
thereby impeding growth.  On the contrary, there is an equally strong argument 
that by focusing on the growth of the debtor countries, this bankruptcy regime 
will promote economic growth.  Moreover, a more debtor friendly bankruptcy 
regime will result in closer scrutiny on the part of borrowers by lenders; some 
borrowers may lose—those who are less credit worthy—but other borrowers will 
gain; and the incentives that result from closer scrutiny may themselves contribute 
to economic growth.   
 
 
Global Political Economic, legitimacy, and a new bankruptcy regime 
 
Any reform of the global bankruptcy regime must begin from the premise that 
there are conflicts of interest, not only between debtors and creditors, but also 
among creditors, and even among those within the creditor market (e.g. between 
intermediaries who may gain from the restructuring process and others), and that 
these conflicts of interests may change over time. Countries with large amounts of 
outstanding debt may well oppose collective action clauses, both because the cost 
of converting from existing contracts to new contracts will likely be largely borne 
by them, but also because if markets charge higher interest rates for such bonds, 
they will be facing possibly substantial increases in interest costs.   
 
One of the arguments for bankruptcy reform is that it leads to better incentives on 
the part of lenders; these incentives, however, will not be at work in the case of 
pre-existing debt.  To be sure, if such collective action clauses really do lower the 
cost of debt resolution, and the lower cost of debt resolution does not exacerbate 
default-moral hazard problems, then the benefits of adding these clauses could be 
substantial, and lenders (who have already committed funds) could be willing to 
pay both the costs of restructuring and lower the interest rates charged.  If the 
initiative for restructuring bond agreements comes from lenders and is 
accompanied by a lower interest rate, then there may not be the adverse “signal” 
associated with such clauses.   
 
However, if all lenders do not judge the gains to be substantial, there will still be a 
classic free rider problem in the exchange of bonds.  Lenders will exchange only 
if they receives more wealth with the new bonds than with the old.  But, in a 
voluntary exchange that would mean that the debtor would be compensating the 
creditor.   If debtors are rational they will only participate if they can offset the 
higher costs.  In a voluntary exchange ‘carrots and sticks’ from the IMF will only 
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work if the net benefit to the country is positive. Sticks alone could have a 
negative effect since the IMF has the most leverage over those countries that are 
most in need of IMF funding.  If debtors and lenders recognize this, then 
participating in the exchange could signal that a country is in need of IMF 
assistance, and the incentive to participate on the part of the debtor will fall 
farther. 
 
Even within borrowing countries, interests differ.  As we have noted, a 
government which has access to the market today may wish to obtain as much as 
it can at as low an interest rate as it can, paying little attention to the consequences 
ten years later, or in any case, minimizing the risks.  Those who bear the brunt of 
the crisis may have a different attitude. 
 
It should be clear, however, that whatever proposal is put forward, there will be 
winners and losers, both relative to the status quo and relative to other possible 
reforms.   
 
 The objective of reform is not to maximize income of creditors, or even to 
maximize the flow of funds from the developed to the less developed countries, 
but rather to maximize the growth and stability within the developing countries.  
(This may not be a goal shared by all participants in the discussion.)  Any 
reform—and any bankruptcy process—must be seen to be fair and equitable to the 
interests of debtors as well as creditors, both to those who bear the benefits from 
increased borrowing and those who bear the costs in the event of a crisis.   
 
At the current time, there is no international institution that has both the 
legitimacy and expertise to oversee an international bankruptcy process.  The 
IMF, as a major creditor, cannot be viewed as impartial.   But even apart from 
that, both in the distribution of voting rights and in country representation, it is not 
well situated to take on a central role, even with respect to the issue of  “asset 
preservation.”  The interests of other legitimate claimants (workers and the elderly 
within the country) would be viewed as being compromised.  Any reform that is 
seen as giving more power to the IMF may well be seen as creating even greater 
imbalance in an international financial architecture that is already imbalanced. 
 
As contracts increasingly involve participants in many jurisdictions, there is 
increasingly a need for better resolution of disputes that cross boundaries, 
including those involving bankruptcy.  Eventually, some kind of International 
Bankruptcy Organization will need to be created.  I believe that it would be 
desirable to begin outlining the principles which would guide such debt 
resolutions, by discussions centered not just around the G-7 and the creditor 






A short run solution 
 
In the short run, there are three measures that are both practicable and could make 
a difference: 
 
 A recognition of the importance of the imposition of capital controls/exit taxes in 
the event of crises that are likely to lead to sovereign bankruptcy 
 
 An agreement on “mutual recognition” of the bankruptcy laws of each other and 
procedures to resolve jurisdictional conflicts.  If a bankruptcy procedure is going 
forward under the laws of one jurisdiction, it should not be possible for a claimant 
to appeal to a more friendly court in another jurisdiction, e.g. to attach assets.   
 
 An international bankruptcy evaluation/mediation service, which would help 
evaluate the consequences of different proposed resolutions on different parties, 
both different categories of creditors, the government, and the economy. 
 
In the absence of an agreement on what the law should be, independent 
information about the impacts from a disinterested third party could be of 
enormous value in constructing what may be viewed by all parties as a fair 
solution.  It should be clear that such evaluations would not be without 
controversy, and it would be important that alternative perspectives be provided.  
For instance, information that a class of creditors received 25% interest 
(presumably in part because of the fear of bankruptcy) for five years before 
default occurred—and therefore more than recovered his principal—might or 
might not be considered relevant in deciding on whether a more substantial write 
down in his debt was fair (in comparison, say, to a creditor who lent money a few 
years earlier, before the change in country’s economic circumstances, and had 
received only 6% interest.)   
 
Of particular relevance would be the impact on the debtor country.  Just as 
workers are viewed as senior claimants on a company’s assets, those within the 
country can be viewed as having legitimate, and sometimes senior, claims on the 
sovereign.  It is important to know how such claims may be affected by any 
proposed resolution.  We should recognize that there are, among economists, 
major differences about the appropriate economic models, and therefore there will 
be disagreements.  The prevalent models among the academic/forecasting 
community involves Keynesian style models in which decreases in aggregate 
demand, resulting from reductions say in government expenditures, have 
multiplier effects on aggregate output in periods of deficient aggregate demand, 
and lead to increased unemployment.  But there are those who, even in periods of 
seeming large underutilization of a nation’s resources, focus on aggregate supply, 
and others who put the primary emphasis on changes in “confidence,” arguing 
that, presumably through channels like investment and consumption, such 
changes have a first order effect on output, and link such changes in confidence to 




The credibility of such an international service would depend on its openness and 
transparency, and the balance with which it presents perspectives that are 
supportive to the various sides in dispute.  I believe it would be possible, with a 
limited allocation of resources, to create such a service.  Though it would not 
address all the problems associated with the resolution of bankruptcy, it could 
help facilitate the resolution; and it would be far preferable to a legal structure that 
is unbalanced or lacks broad legitimacy.  Attaining such a legal structure may be 
difficult to achieve in the short run.  
   
 
 
